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Abstract
Theoretical articles on incentive systems almost excusively focus on
linear compensations, while in practice, nonlinear elements, eg. quota
bonuses are not uncommon. Our article tries to bridge that gap and show
how the use of quotas can increase the owners’ profit.
JEL codes: D21, L13
Keywords: compensation systems, agents’ incentives
1 Introduction
Theoretical articles on incentive schemes, following Vickers (1985), Fershtman
and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) almost excusively focus on linear compen-
sation systems. Besides analytical tractability, the main reason cited is the
argument put forth by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), who show that in a dy-
namic situation linear compensation schemes are quite robust and under certain
conditions could lead to optimal solutions of the principal-agent problem.
A somewhat similar point is made by Basu and Kalyanaram (1990), who
emphasize that linear contracts can be much more easily understood. They
obtain a result that for their exponential utility function, parametrization as-
suming more risk averse agents leads to the superiority of linear compensation
plans, while using parameters positing less risk averse agents, nonlinear plans
are preferable. A comparison of linear and piecewise linear compensation plans
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by Chen and Miller (2009) tells us that while linear schemes might be bet-
ter using exponential utility functions, in the case of agents with power utility
functions piecewise linear compensation systems are preferable.
However, in practice, nonlinear elements, e.g. quota bonuses are not uncom-
mon. According to an empirical study by Joseph and Kalwani (1998), 5 percent
of the firms participating in the survey used fixed salaries for their salespeople,
24 percent used only commissions, while the overwhelming majority included
some kind of bonus payment in their compensation packages. By far the most
important factor in determining bonus payments was the comparison of actual
sales and a predetermined quota. As Oyer (1998) remarks, executive contracts
also often include quota-like features. The behavior of salespeople – eg. their
attitudes toward risk, as demonstrated by Ross (1991) – is strongly influenced
by how quotas are set.
Oyer (1998) also points out a potential dynamic problem with the use of
quotas. This could lead to uneven effort during the year, since agents increase
their effort when the deadline for determining quota bonus is near. Executives
or salespeople could behave in an opportunistic manner and engage in ”timing
games”, ie. rushing sales or using creative accounting to ensure the quota bonus.
However, the findings of Steenburgh (2008), based on analysing individual-level
salesforce data, seem to indicate that timing games are less common in practice
and the main effect of quotas are to increase the efforts of the agents.
In this paper, we try to link the two strands of literature and to incorporate
the use of quotas in a theoretical model of incentives.
2 The model
The owner of the firm employs two agents (salespeople) to sell the product.1
Their ”downstream market” is a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, thus the (nor-
malized) demand for the products sold by the kth agent is 1−pk−bp−k, where pk
is the price charged by the kth agent, p−k is the price charged by the other agent,
and 0 < b < 1 represents the homogeneity or differentiation of the downstream
market.2
The two agents also differ in their efficiency. The agent might have to make
a certain effort to make a sale, which can be either an internal or external cost
born by the agent themself and efficiency is understood as a difference of these
inherent costs.
The agents’ want to maximize their own utility, ie. the difference of their
salary and their effort. The owner wants to maximize their profit.3
1Another interpretation of our model could be an owner with two firms offering incentives
to the executives.
2Of course, this can be easily generalized for the case when an ”outside” competitor exists,
assuming constant marginal costs and competitive or markup pricing.
3In line with the literature, we only focus on the profit from sales and omit the deduction
of the salaries paid. This can be justified if the agents’ alternative utility is low enough or
the fixed part of their salary is high enough, since in that case the variable bonuses could be
negligible when comparing outcomes.
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The owner thus first sets the compensation scheme in this two-stage game.
The compensation (disregarding a possible fixed part of the salary) depends on
the profit from the sales of the agent and – if the owner chooses to include it –
a reward if sales exceed a certain quota4.
In the second stage of the game, the salespeople – knowing the relevant in-
centives – set their prices and competition occurs. However, we assume that
there is some uncertainty about finalized sales within the given period5. For
simple analytical treatment, we describe this uncertainty with a uniformly dis-
tributed error term, thus when an agent expects to sell q unit (based on the
demand they face), then the actual number of completed sales is a realization
from the [q − ε, q + ε] interval.6
3 Results
3.1 Optimal choice of the agents
The salespeople want to maximize they expected bonuses – their commisions
from the profit and the quota bonus. Due to the uncertainty described above,
the existence of the quota is going to affect their behavior only if their planned
sales are close to the quota; if they deem the quota unreachable, or they are
utterly confident about quota fullfilment then they do not need to include the
quota in their calculations.
More formally, assume that the quota (Q) is fixed. In this case, there are
four possible cases for each agent.
1. Planned optimal output is less than Q− ε.
2. Planned optimal output is between Q− ε and Q+ ε.
3. Planned optimal output is equal to Q+ ε (corner solution).
4. Planned optimal output exceeds Q+ ε.
In the first case, P (bonus) = 0, so the kth agent maximizes (1 − pk −
bp−k)(pk − ek), where ek is the necessary effort on the behalf of the kth agent,
so their first-order condition is 1 + ek − 2pk − bp−k = 0. Thus they will set the
following price: pk =
1
2 (1 + ek − bp−k).
In the second case, P (bonus) = qk−(Q−ε)2ε , so the kth agent maximizes (1 −
pk − bp−k)(pk − ek) + λ (1−pk−bp−k)−(Q−ε)2ε , where λ is the quota bonus. The
first-order condition for the agent is therefore 1 + ek− bp−k−2pk− λ2ε = 0. The
optimal choice for the agent is to set the price as: pk =
1
2 (1 + ek − bp−k)− λ4ε
4According to Joseph and Kalwani (1998), approximately 35 percent of the firms in the
sample studied used both commissions and quotas in their compensation schemes.
5Thus, as in Oyer (1998), we also pay some attention to the timing of the finalized sales;
however, we focus on unintentional timing effects.
6Again, a possible alternative interpretation of our model could be mentioned: this is
equivalent to a quota bonus with upper and lower cap. Cf. Figure II in Oyer (1998).
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The corner solution implies that 1 + ek − bp−k − 2pk − λ2ε < 0 and 1 + ek −
2pk − bp−k > 0 whilst qi = Q + ε. The discussion of the ”corner solution”,
however, will be omitted since it can be easily shown that this is not going to
be optimal for the owner.7
In the last case, P (bonus) = 1, so the first-order condition and the optimal
price for the agent are similar to those of the first case. Hence in the following, I
will refer to the first and fourth case as ”outside the quota range”, to the second
case as ”within the quota range”. Furthermore, if both salespeople are within
the quota range, I will use the term ”pooling quota”, while if only one of them
is in the quota range, I will talk about a ”separating quota”.
Furthermore, from now on, I will denote the more efficient agent as agent i
and the less efficient agent as agent j. Efforts are normalized so that ei = 0 and
ej = e.
3.2 Comparison of quota regimes
Now we have to solve a two-stage game, when in the first period the owner
chooses a quota setup and in the second period the agents influenced by the
quota make their pricing decisions and sales take place. We have already taken
a look at the agents’ decisions, so now we have to expand our focus to include
the owner’s problem.
As usual in the literature, we posit a risk-neutral owner, so their task is to
maximize the expected profit. We further make the assumption that uncertainty
shocks to salespeople are independent, hence we can simply use the expected
quantities in our profit calculations.
The case when both agents’ output is outside the quota range8, is simple to
calculate and will be the basis of comparisons to understand the effect of quotas
on the owner’s profit.
Proposition 1. If both agents’ optimal outputs are outside the quota range,
7The owner can use a lower quota bonus, where the relevant first order condition (1 + ek−
bp−k − 2pk − λ2ε = 0) still leads to the same output level.
8Of course, this is equivalent to the baseline case when there are no quotas at all.
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then the expected profit of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 (1)
Proof. It follows from lemma 1. See appendix.
The next case we look at is the one where both agents are within the quota
range. Here we can state the following:
Proposition 2. If the owner introduces a pooling quota, then the expected profit
of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 +
(b+ e+ be)2
2(1 + b)(2 + b)2
(2)
Proof. It is the immediate consequence of lemmas 2 and 3. See appendix.
We can clearly see that introducing a pooling quota increases the profit of
the owner. The case when the focus of the agents moves towards fullfiling their
quota is analogous with the setup when managers of firms competing in prices
are offered sales bonuses. Our proposition is therefore an extension to the result
of Sklivas (1987), showing that quotas in this case can act similarly as quantity
bonuses.
Now let us consider the separating quotas, firstly the one aimed at the more
efficient agent.
Proposition 3. If the owner introduces a separating quota with the more effi-
cient agent within the quota range and the less efficient agent outside the quota
range, then the expected profit of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 +
((2− b)2b+ 2b3e)2
4(4− b2)2(4− 3b2) (3)
Proof. It is implied by lemmas 4 and 5. See appendix.
Examining our latest result, we now find that a separating quota aimed at
the more efficient agent increases profit compared to the baseline case, however,
it provides less profit then the pooling quota.
The last case to discuss is the separating quota aimed at the less efficient
agent.
Proposition 4. If the owner introduces a separating quota with the more effi-
cient agent outside the quota range and the less efficient agent within the quota
range, then the expected profit of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 +
(b((2− b)2 − 6be) + 8e)2
4(4− b2)2(4− 3b2) (4)
Proof. The result follows from lemmas 6 and 7. See appendix.
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Again, the profit is going to be clearly higher than in the baseline case and
also higher than in the case of the separating quota aimed at the more efficient
agent. However, the comparison with the pooling case is not clear-cut. Our
results could be summarised as follows:
Theorem 1. The separating quota aimed at the less efficient agent leads to
higher profit if the efficiency difference is sufficiently high (e > 12). If the effi-
ciency difference is lower than the abovementioned threshold, then for any value
of e, one can find b∗, when for any value of b < b∗, the separating quota aimed
at the less efficient agent leads to higher profit. In other words: if the efficiency
difference is not that high, it is sufficient to have more differentiated agents. In
other cases the pooling quota provides the highest profit, if it is feasible.
We can also predict the effect of different variables on the size of the quota
bonus.
Theorem 2. In the case of an effective quota9, the optimal quota bonus is
increasing in the difference in efficiency and the uncertainty of the agents and
decreasing in the differentiation of the agents.
Proof. See appendix.
4 Summary
Although nonlinear elements of compensation schemes are quite widespread,
theoretical study so far focused on linear incentives. We have shown that if
uncertainty exists regarding the timing of sales, quotas affect the behavior of
agents not unlike quantity bonuses and therefore can increase the profit of the
owners compared to the case when only commissions are used. We have fur-
ther shown that although quotas are useful in symmetric cases as well, their
significance increases if the abilities of the agents are different.
Appendix
Using the derived reaction functions for the different cases from subsection 3.1,
we can easily find the equilibrium prices and expected quantities for the possible
pairings of the agents.
A No effective quota
In this case the quota is irrelevant in either agent’s optimization problem. The
first-order conditions are as follows:
1 + ei − 2pi − bpj = 0
1 + ej − 2pj − bpi = 0
}
(5)
9Ie. at least one agent is within the quota range.
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Solving this system of equations for pi and pj , then using those results to
calculate the quantities, we can work out the outcome of this case.
Lemma 1. If both agents’ optimal outputs are outside the quota range, then
the equilibrium prices and expected outputs are:
pi =
2− b− be
4− b2 (6)
pj =
2− b+ 2e
4− b2 (7)
qi =
2− b− be
4− b2 (8)
qj =
2− b− 2e+ b2e
4− b2 (9)
B Pooling quota
Now both first-order conditions include the the expected value of the quota
bonus:
1 + ei − bpj − 2pi − λ
2ε
= 0
1 + ej − bpi − 2pj − λ
2ε
= 0
 (10)
Again, we can solve for the equilibrium prices and then derive the equilibrium
quantities, conditional on the quota bonus.
If both agents’ optimal outputs are within the quota range, ie. the owner
introduces a pooling quota, then the equilibrium prices and expected outputs
are:
pi =
2− b− be
4− b2 −
λ
2ε(2 + b)
(11)
pj =
2− b+ 2e
4− b2 −
λ
2ε(2 + b)
(12)
qi =
2− b− be
4− b2 +
λ(1 + b)
2ε(2 + b)
(13)
qj =
2− b− 2e+ b2e
4− b2 +
λ(1 + b)
2ε(2 + b)
(14)
Using the fact that according to our assumption the owner maximizes pi =
piqi + pjqj , we can calculate the profit of the owner conditional on the quota
bonus.
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Lemma 2. If the owner introduces a pooling quota, and further the owner gives
lambda bonus for fulfilling the quota, then the expected profit of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 −
λ((1 + b)λ− 2(b+ e+ be)x)
2(2 + b)2ε2
(15)
Now, the owner chooses the bonus which maximizes their profit. The first-
order condition is
(b+ e+ be)ε− (1 + b)λ
(2 + b)2ε2
= 0 (16)
The solution of the above equation gives us:
Lemma 3. If the owner introduces a pooling quota, the owner-optimal bonus
for fulfilling the quota is:
λ∗ =
(b+ e+ be)ε
1 + b
(17)
C Separating quota aimed at the more efficient
agent
The relevant first-order conditions this time are:
1 + ei − bpj − 2pi − λ
2ε
= 0
1 + ej − bpi − 2pj = 0
 (18)
The equilibrium prices and the quantities can be easily derived from this
system of equations for a fixed quota bonus.
If the optimal output of agent i is within the quota range and that of agent j
is outside the quota range, ie. the owner introduces a separating quota, aimed at
the more efficient salesperson, then the equilibrium prices and expected outputs
are:
pi =
2− b− be
4− b2 −
λ
ε(4− b2) (19)
pj =
2− b+ 2e
4− b2 +
λb
2ε(4− b2) (20)
qi =
2− b− be
4− b2 +
λ(2− b2)
2ε(4− b2) (21)
qj =
2− b− 2e+ b2e
4− b2 +
λb
2ε(4− b2) (22)
Simple calculation gives us the profit conditional on the quota bonus:
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Lemma 4. If the separating quota is aimed at the more efficient agent, and
further the owner gives λ bonus for fulfilling the quota then the expected profit
of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 −
λ((−4 + 3b2)λ+ 2b(4 + b(−4 + b+ 2be))ε)
4(4− b2)2ε2 (23)
Since the owner wants to maximize their profit, they choose the quota bonus
according to the following first-order condition:
b(4 + b(−4 + b+ 2be))ε− (4− 3b2)λ
2(4− b2)2ε2 = 0 (24)
Thus we can state the following:
Lemma 5. If the owner introduces a separating quota that is focusing on the
more efficient agent, the owner-optimal bonus for fulfilling the quota is:
λ∗ =
b(4− 4b+ b2 + 2b2e)ε
4− 3b2 (25)
D Separating quota aimed at the more efficient
agent
In the last case, we start with the following first-order conditions:
1 + ei − bpj − 2pi = 0
1 + ej − bpi − 2pj − λ
2ε
= 0
 (26)
Solving first for prices, then inferring the quantities, we can again obtain the
outcome given the quota bonus.
If the optimal output of agent i is outside the quota range and that of agent j
is within the quota range, ie. the owner introduces a separating quota, aimed at
the less efficient salesperson, then the equilibrium prices and expected outputs
are:
pi =
2− b− be
4− b2 +
λb
2ε(4− b2) (27)
pj =
2− b+ 2e
4− b2 −
λ
ε(4− b2) (28)
qi =
2− b− be
4− b2 +
λb
2ε(4− b2) (29)
qj =
2− b− 2e+ b2e
4− b2 + +
λ(2− b2)
2ε(4− b2) (30)
Using this, the profit of the owner is:
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Lemma 6. If the separating quota is targeted at the less efficient agent, and
further the owner gives λ bonus for fulfilling the quota then the expected profit
of the owner is:
pi =
2− be
(2 + b)2
− (4− 3b
2)ε2
(4− b2)2 −
λ((4− 3b2)λ− 2(8e+ b((2− b)2 − 6be))ε)
4(4− b2)2ε2 (31)
The following first-order condition ensures profitmaximization for the owner:
(8e+ b((−2 + b)2 − 6be))ε− (4− 3b2)λ
2(4− b2)2ε2 = 0 (32)
Solving this for λ, we arrive to:
Lemma 7. If the owner introduces a separating quota that is focusing on the
less efficient agent, the owner-optimal bonus for fulfilling the quota is:
λ∗ =
(b((2− b)2 − 6be) + 8e)ε
4− 3b2 (33)
E Proof of Theorem 2
If quotas are effective, three cases are to be considered:
• pooling quota
• separating quota aimed at the more efficient agent
• separating quota aimed at the less efficient agent
E.1 Pooling quota
We have obtained the owner-optimal bonus in lemma 3. Its derivatives show us
how certain changes affect the size of the quota bonus.
∂λ
∂e
= ε > 0 (34)
∂λ
∂ε
=
b+ e+ be
1 + b
> 0 (35)
∂λ
∂b
=
(1 + e)x
1 + b
− (b+ e+ be)x
(1 + b)2
> 0 (36)
E.2 Separating quota aimed at the more efficient agent
The optimal bonus is given by lemma 5. The changes are shown by following
derivatives:
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∂λ
∂e
=
2b3ε
4− 3b2 > 0 (37)
∂λ
∂ε
=
b(4− 4b+ b2(1 + 2e))
4− 3b2 > 0 (38)
∂λ
∂b
=
(16 + b(−32 + 24b(1 + e)− 3b3(1 + 2e)))ε
(4− 3b2)2 > 0 (39)
E.3 Separating quota aimed at the less efficient agent
The size of the quota bonus is shown in lemma 7. The relevant derivatives are
as follows:
∂λ
∂e
=
(8− 6b2)ε
4− 3b2 > 0 (40)
∂λ
∂ε
=
8e+ b((−2 + b)2 − 6be)
4− 3b2 > 0 (41)
∂λ
∂b
=
(16 + b(−32 + 24b− 3b3))ε
(4− 3b2)2 > 0 (42)
The theorem follows from the above inequalities.
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